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fees were available under a claim for
maintenance and cure; and whether the
Supreme Court's Miles decision and
ninth circuit precedent precluded punitive
damages on a general maritime action.
The ninth circuit noted that in order for
Glynn to recover under the Jones Act he
had to show a defendant was his em
ployer. Cosmopolitan Shopping Co. v.
McAllister, 337 U.S. 783,787 n.6 ( 1 949).
The district court had found as a matter of
Jaw that an employer/employee relation
ship existed between Glynn and Roy AI.
The ninth circuit rejected Roy Al's argu
ment that the jury could have found
Glynn to be a joint venturer or indepen
dent contractor on the basis of the com
pensation arrangement, which was based
on a receipt of a percentage of profits.
The appellate court concluded that no rea
sonable jury could have found factually
that Glynn was anything other than an
employee, considering several factors
such as payment, direction, supervision
and source of power to hire and fire.
Matute v. Lloyd Bermuda Lines, Ltd., 931
F.2d 23 1 , 236 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502
u.s. 9 1 9 ( 1 99 1 ).
The appeals court also concluded that
the district court had erred in submitting
defendant Shawhan's employer status as
a j ury question. The court stated that,
since there could only be one employer
for the purposes of the Jones Act and that
it had already been determined that Roy
AI was Glynn' s employer, the j ury should
not have been permitted to consider the
question of whether or not Shawhan was
also Glynn's employer.
With respect to the issue of whether
Glynn was entitled to attorney's fees, the
ninth circuit noted that it was well estab
lished, since Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369
U.S. 527 ( 1 962), that an injured seaman
could recover attorney's fees where de
fendant had acted willfully and persis
tently in failing to pay maintenance and
cure. The court treated the issue as aban
doned by defendant Roy AI, since it did
not seriously contest the issue of its
"willful and persistent" failure to either
investigate Glynn's claim or pay mainte
nance.
The appeals court, instead, focussed on
Glynn's assertion that the lower court had
not properly set the level of fees on his
claim. The court determined that the
lower court did not abuse its discretion in
fixing the amount of fees awarded and
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that the amount awarded was reason
should be awarded punitive damages in
able, affirming the result. The ninth
addition to attorney' s fees since attor
circuit observed with approval that the
ney's fees alone were a powerful incen
district court, in fixing the fees, had
tive deterring employers from willfully
used factors set forth in Kerr v. Screen
and arbitrarily refusing to pay mainte
Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70
nance and cure.
(9th Cir. 1 975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
As to other issues raised, the court
95 1 ( 1 976), such as time and labor re
ruled that Glynn's failure to submit the
quired, novelty and difficulty of the
question of prejudgment interest to the
question involved, skill necessary to jury served as a waiver on his prejudg
pursue the claim, preclusion of other
ment entitlement and that the district
employment, etc.
court had not erred in finding that a
The ninth circuit focussed in the criti
magistrate could not order payment of
cal part of its opinion on the issue of maintenance and cure as a condition for
whether the district court had erred in
lifting a default against defendants. The
finding that Glynn was not entitled to
lower court had found that there was a
disputed issue of fact as to whether any
punitive damages on the maintenance
injury had befallen Glynn aboard the
and cure claim. The court, in its analy
sis, relied on Miles v. Apex Marine
No Problem, which required a determi
Corp. , 498 U.S. 1 9 ( 1 990), concluding
nation before he could prevail and,
therefore, such an action by the magis
that punitive damages are not recover
able for defendant's willful, 'arbitrary trate would have been premature.
and persistent failure to pay mainte
Alexia I. Panteris
nance and cure. Glynn v. Roy At Boat
Management Corp. , 57 F.3d 1 495,
Class of 1 996
1 505. The court extended the Miles ra
tionale l imiting nonpecuniary recovery
0
0
0
to general maritime causes of action on
the theory that such recovery was not
COGSA Carriers
provided for in the "uniform plan of
maritime tort law Congress created."
CH ARTERER CAN BIND VESSEL
The appeals court rejected Glynn's ar
OWNER DESP ITE CH ARTER
gument that it should not abandon the
P ARTY INDEM NITY CL AUSE BY
ninth circuit's recognition of punitive
SIG NING "FOR TH E M ASTER"
damages for failure to pay maintenance
and cure under the pre-Miles precedent
Charter party authorizing charterer
of Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256 (9th
to sign for master could bind vessel
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 9 1 4
owner as COG SA carrier even
( 1 987). The court pointed out that the
though charter party ex pressly
language in Evich supporting plain
incl ud ed ind emnification provision;
tiffs position was dictum. The ninth
shippers f ail ed to meet fifth circuit
circuit expressly refused to follow the
privity stand ard or makeprima facie
fifth circuit' s opinion in Guevara v.
bailment cl aim against owner.
Maritime Overseas Corp., 34 F.3d
1 279 (5th Cir. 1 994), where the court
(Thyssen Steel Company v. MIV Kava
upheld a punitive damage award for
Yerakas, CA5, 50 F.3d 1349, 4127195)
failure to pay maintenance and cure.
The ninth circuit noted that decisions
Thyssen Steel Company (Thyssen)
upholding punitive damages relied
entered
into a contract with Europe
"directly or indirectly" on the Vaughan
Overseas Steamship Lines (Eurolines)
case. The Supreme Court in that case
to carry steel from Europe to Texas
had acknowledged for the first time
aboard the ship MN Kava Yerakas,
that damages for failure to give mainte
which had been time chartered to
nance and cure may include "necessary
Eurolines by its owner, Dodekaton
expenses, including attorney's fees,
Corporation (Dodekaton). Pursuant to
when the failure to pay maintenance is
loading the cargo of steel pipe, bills of
willful and persistent." Glynn, 57 F.3d
lading were issued and signed by the
at 1 504. The ninth circuit concluded
Eurolines agent "for the master."
that there is no reason why the plaintiff
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Upon arrival in Texas, some of the cargo
was damaged. Thyssen and other plain
tiffs brought an action against the M/V
Kava Yerakas, Dodekaton and Eurolines
for cargo damage occurring during tran
sit. The district court entered judgment in
favor of vessel owner Dodekaton. The
other defendants settled and plaintiffs ap
pealed the judgment in favor of Dodeka
ton.
Under COG SA, a cargo owner may only
recover from the carrier of the goods. Pa
cific Employers Ins. Co. v. MIV Gloria
767 F.2d 229, 234 (5th Cir. 1 985). A
"carrier" is "the owner or the charterer
who enters into a contract of carriage with
a shipper." 46 U.S.C. app. § 1 30 l (a). A
"contract of carriage" takes the form of a
bill of lading or other similar document of
title. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1 30 l (b). A con
tract of carriage with a vessel owner may
be directly between the parties or through
the charterer's authority to sign bills of
lading "for the master." Pacific Employ
ers, 767 F.2d at 236. If, however, the
charterer signs without the authority of
the vessel owner, then the owner will not
be a party to the contract of carriage and
will not be a "carrier" under COGSA.
Pacific Employers, 767 F.2d at 237; J.
Gerber & Co. v. MIV Inagua Tania, 828
F.Supp. 458, 460 (S.D. Tex. 1 992). To
establish liability for the vessel owner
the cargo owner must show that th;
shipowner was a party to the contract·
failure to do so will show that the carg�
owner did not rely on the owner to per
form the contract.
The district court did not confront the
contention that Eurolines, the charterer,
had power to sign bills of lading on be
half of Dodekaton based on charter party
provisions nearly indistinguishable from
those contained in the Pacific Employers
case. In Pacific Employers, the fifth cir
cuit found that charter party provisions
largely identical to Clause 8 and 45 of the
Thyssen charter party entitled the char
terer to sign bills of lading on behalf of
the vessel owner. Pacific Employers, 767
Fa111995
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F.2d at 237-38. However, the major de
parture from the Pacific Employers'
charter versus that of Thyssen is that the
latter charter contained an in
demnification provision, making the
case more factually similar to a case in
the fourth circuit, Yeramex Interna
tional v. S.S. Tendo, 595 F.2d 943 (4th
Cir. 1 979). The fifth circuit considered
the Yeramex case in its analysis when
examining the effect of the indemnity
clause.
A provision in a contract of carriaae
that purports to relieve a party of liabii
ity is expressly void under the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act. See 46 U.S.C.
app. § 1 303(8). In the Yeramex case the
fourth circuit did not allow a much more
elaborate indemnity provision by itself
alone to exonerate the vessel owner
from traditional responsibilities for ves
sel seaworthiness, etc. The fifth circuit
circuit agreed with this concept, decid
ing that the indemnity provision did not
have a bearing on the owner's liability
as a COGSA carrier.
In sum, the fact that the parties had a
charter party and bill of lading nearly
identical to those found in Pacific Em
ployers was controlling. Clause 45 of
the Thyssen charter party entitled the
master to allow Eurolines' agent to sign
the bills of lading, binding the owner.
If, the court stated, on remand, the ship
pers proved that the master had actually
authorized Eurolines to sign on his be
half, then the Pacific Employers frame
work would be fulfilled, providing nec
essary privity with the vessel owner
thereby meeting the definition of
COGSA carrier.
In the absence of this proof, the court
held that the fifth circuit's standard for
COGSA liability required privity, re
jecting arguments by the plaintiffs hold
ing up second circuit cases where claims
were directly asserted against vessel
owners in privity's absence. A better
argument by Thyssen, which was enter
tained by the court, was the assertion
that the district court had erred in find
ing no common law bailment claim
against the vessel owner for cargo dam
age.
In the absence of COGSA
"carriage of goods," which is defined as
covering "the period from the time
when the goods are loaded on to the
time when they are discharged from the
ship," 46 U.S.C. app. § 1 30 1 (e), the

plaintiffs argued that Dodekaton was li
able under common law as a bailee of
cargo for damage caused by its own
negligence.
The fifth circuit, however, found that
plaintiff-appellants had not established
a primafacie bailment claim against the
owner. First, plaintiffs did not show
that an express or implied bailment con
tract existed. Second, the plaintiffs
failed to establish that the cargo was
within Dodekaton's exclusive posses
sion during transit. (The cargo was also
within Eurolines'- the charterer's
possession.) The appeals court af
firmed the district court, finding that,
even if a general maritime bailment
claim were permissible as a matter of
law, Dodekaton was not liable as a
bailee for cargo damage.
William Burkett
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Supplemental Rules
SECOND CIRCUIT RULES
COURTS CAN'T DENY
COUNTERSECURITY ON
ARBITRABLE ACTIONS
While trial courts have broad discre
tion when ordering countersecurity
in proceedings brought under Section
� of the Arbitration Act, arbitrability
IS not permissible basis for denying
countersecurity since the result
would conflict with clear purposes of
the Arbitration Act and Supplemen
tal Fed. R. Civ. P . E(7).
(Result Shipping Co. , Ltd. v. Ferruzzi
Trading USA, Inc. , CA2, 56 F.3d 394,
5125195)

Grain was shipped from the United
States to Jordan pursuant to a contract
between defendant Ferruzzi Trading
USA, Inc. (Ferruzzi) and the Jordanian
Ministry of Supply. Ferruzzi chartered
�e MIV Bulk Topaz from Result Ship
pmg Co., Ltd. (Result) in order to ship
the grain. The charter party between
Ferruzzi and Result provided that all
disputes arising out of the charter would
be subject to arbitration in London.
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